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Poland and the Soviet Union 
the Post-Communist Relationship1
Roger E Kanet and Brian V Souders
A recent analysis of USSR Polish relations began as follows Short of an unexpected decline in Soviet power 
politics m Poland toward the end of this century will continue to operate within the same international 
framework of domination as m the previous four and a half decades 2 Despite changes already evident m Soviet 
foreign relations and despite the growing evidence of the vitality of internal opposition m the commumst ruled 
countries two truths continued to underlie Western analysis that communists would never give up political 
power without a fight and that the Soviet leadership would never permit the collapse of communist regimes m 
Eastern Europe 3
In this article the authors are especially interested in explaining the rapid collapse of commumsm 
throughout Eastern Europe and the willingness of the Soviet leadership to accept that demise Moreover they 
examine the role of Poland m this process and the probable nature of future relations between mdependent and 
democratic Poland and the USSR
The Central European Revolutions of 1989
The year 1989 was one of histone importance for Poland Eastern Europe and the entire international 
community and a watershed m the history of Europe At the beginning of the year political leaders in Poland 
and Hungary gave enthusiastic support to Soviet leader Mikhail S Gorbachev s reform programs Yet even in 
Poland the impetus for successful reform seemed to have stalled By the end of the year a Solidarity 
government ruled Poland, the Berlin Wall had fallen and German reunification was but a matter of time 
Ceaucescu s dictatorship had been overthrown in Romania, and the world renowned dissident playwright Vaclav 
Havel had been elected president in Czechoslovakia Revolutionary change m the full sense of the term was 
occurring throughout the region as the basic structures of domestic political power including the formal 
institutions of governance and the structures of the European inter state system were radically changing
Central to the dramatic changes throughout Eastern Europe were those that resulted during September 1989 
m the creation of the first non communist Pohsh government since the 1940s In the past, any movement 
toward reform met with strong Soviet resistance By 1989 the USSR s policy had shifted to the point where it 
encouraged reform and was even willing to accept expanded pluralism and the demise of communist dictatorships 
as the pnce for economic efficiency and political stability in the region and enhanced long term political and 
economic relationships with the W est
The radical changes that occurred m Eastern Europe dunng 1989 must be viewed m the context of Soviet 
style state socialism which consisted of a highly centralized economy emphasizing heavy industry authontanan 
political structures to ensure political control by miniscule and illegitimate communist party elites and a strong 
dependency relationship between the USSR and the smaller commumst states However since Stalin s death in 
1953 evidence mounted that demonstrated both the political and the economic weaknesses of the system
1 An earlier version of this paper entitled “Poland and the Soviet Union The Post-communist Relationship was 
presented at the Workshop on Soviet-Central European Relationships m the 1990s sponsored by the US Institute of 
Peace and the Hoover Institution Washington DC 21 October 1990 A slightly modified version is scheduled for 
publication as Poland and the Soviet Union the Post Commumst Relationship Richard Staar ed The Soviet Union and 
East Central Europe in the 1990s New York St Martin s Press London Macmillan Press (in press)
2 Arthur R Rachwald Poland Toward the Year 2000 in Richard F Staar ed United States East European Relations m the 
1990s (New York Crane Russale 1989) p 83
3 The term Eastern Europe refers to the countries that comprised the Soviet sphere of domination until very recently— 
including Bulgaria Czechoslovakia the GDR Hungary Poland and Rom ama while “East-Central Europe refers to newly 
mdependent Czechoslovakia Hungary and Poland
2Sporadically and unsuccessfully until 1989 attempts were made in the various countries concerned to reform 
portions of the state socialist system inherited from Stalin
After the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 organized movements committed to the protection of 
political and human rights were active (and under pressure) m several European communist states Evidence also 
mounted about the economic stagnation and the fact that the communist economies were falling behind their 
capitalist counterparts m the development and adaptation of modem technology Moreover the growing 
shortages of consumer goods and housing and the inability to halt the degradation of the environment 
contributed to growing dissatisfaction with the existing political system and to the demand for political reform 
that would extend effective political participation beyond the narrow circle of the communist party elite
Even before the nse to political prominence of Mikhail Gorbachev and the introduction of new thinking 
m the USSR evidence existed of a growing awareness of the nature of the problems facing commumst mied 
states the imperatives of initiating economic and political reform and expanding flexibility m relations between 
the USSR and its Eastern European allies Thus by the 1980s the situation throughout much of the region 
was npe for political change However the efforts at reform expanded to the point of dismantling essential 
elements of ¿he traditional state socialist system only after 1985—from the dominance of central planning to the 
emergence of officially sanctioned pluralism and the demise of the commumst nomenklatura
Gorbachev s Reforms and The Central European Revolutions
Smce Gorbachev s reforms were central to the revolutionary changes that occurred throughout Eastern Europe it 
is important to outline their most prominent contours First the USSR was already m the throes of a major 
cnsis when Gorbachev became General Secretary The Soviet gross national product had stagnated the 
population suffered from increasing political ennui and withdrawal alcoholism and incompetent medical care 
resulted m reduced life expectancy and a higher infant mortality rate 4 The USSR s allies m Eastern Europe 
suffered from similar problems and were a growing dram on the Soviet economy Third World clients had proven 
incapable of establishing stable political or economic systems and contributed to the growing costs of empire 
for Moscow the exponential growth of USSR military capabilities had occurred at the expense of other sectors 
of the economy and many of the assumptions that undergirded Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev years 
had proven false
In this environment, Gorbachev proposed dramatic reforms as a means to rejuvenate the USSR s economic 
and political system In effect the initial Gorbachev message can be summarized as follows the USSR faced 
an economic and political crisis that undermined its ability to provide basic goods and services to its population 
and threatened to erode its position as a global power Revolutionary changes were required within the economy 
to deal with these problems and to increase efficiency enhance quality and reduce the technological gap with the 
W est Such reforms however would generate opposition within the party state bureaucracy that benefits 
greatly from the perquisites associated with the present system To overcome this opposition glasnost or 
openness) and democratization were to create an alliance between the reform minded leadership and the masses of 
the population aimed at exposing the corruption incompetence and inefficiencies of the current system and 
thus contributing to the success of the reform effort
Thus perestroika openness and democratization were interrelated from the beginning of the Gorbachev 
reform effort Moreover new thinking and new behavior in foreign policy were also an integral part of the 
reforms The nature scope and cost of domestic reform would require a peaceful international environment m 
which Soviet leaders would be able to devote more of their attention to the issues associated with reform 
Moreover the costs of Soviet foreign policy would have to be reduced dramatically to cover the expanded 
investment demands of a successful revitalization of the economy Smce past commitments of extensive
4 The following discussion is based especially on Mikhail Gorbachev Perestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the 
World (New York Harper & Row 1987) Abel Aganbegyan The Economic Challenge o f Perestroika (Bloomington/ 
Indianapolis Indiana University Press 1988) and Ed A Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy Equality versus 
Efficiency (Washington DC The Brookings Institution 1988)
3resources to allies and clients in Eastern Europe and the Third World had not resulted in politically stable and 
economically productive states those commitments would have to be reconsidered Since the expansion of 
Soviet military capabilities had not resulted m enhanced security efforts would be essential to achieve security 
through accommodation and assurance strategies toward the West and thus to reduce the military burden
Soviet policy after 1985 underwent more than mere rhetorical change The dramatic shift m the USSR s 
position on a number of issues concerning nuclear weapons and arms control was essential to the agreement to 
scrap all intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia. The announcement, m December 1988 that 
the USSR would unilaterally reduce its military strength in Central Europe and the implementation of the first 
stage of that withdrawal represented yet another shift m policy
An important component of Gorbachev s foreign policy initiatives concerned bilateral relations with the 
countries of Eastern Europe By 1987 his response to the growing economic and political problems of the 
region was to call upon the Eastern European leaders to reform their own political and economic systems 
Unlike past Soviet rulers Gorbachev argued that ultimately the decision on reform as other major decisions 
must be made by the Eastern Europeans themselves Moscow no longer viewed itself as the final arbiter of 
ideological orthodoxy for its clients according to the new interpretation of socialist internationalism
At first Gorbachev hoped that Eastern European communists could reform their economies and political 
systems to make them viable and productive However after they failed in this task he accepted the idea of a 
region of stable economically efficient though non communist states as preferable to a continuation of the 
effort to maintain politically illegitimate and economically stagnant communist regimes by force or threat of 
force Policy was changed in the expectation that mutually beneficial relationships can emerge m the future 
between the Soviet Union and Europe s dominant economic power Germany and a revitalized set of ‘Finland 
like states in Eastern Europe
Several important points emerge from the discussion to this point First the revolutionary changes that 
occurred in all the Soviet dominated communist states were interconnected and had common roots in emergmg 
social groups which placed increasingly greater demands for participation on the communist elites which 
dominated the systems Authoritarian elites were no longer able to suppress these groups nor to ignore their 
demands The result was that during the last months of 1989 they were overthrown
In addition to similar origins the 1989 revolutions were also influenced by changes m Soviet policy toward 
the region and by the demonstration effect of developments throughout the area. Gorbachev s repeated 
assertion that Eastern Europeans should determine their own fate and that the USSR would not intervene to 
undermine the process of long needed political reform contributed to the radical political changes 5 This hands 
o ff approach to the challenges to the ruling party elites m Eastern Europe—in fact Gorbachev openly advocated 
political reform in some countries—encouraged those advocating political change to press forward their demands 
more openly 6 The success of the Polish Solidarity movement m challenging communist party domination 
winning an election and taking over political power—all without Soviet intervention—exerted a powerful 
influence elsewhere m Eastern Europe
5 During his address to the parti amentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July 1989 Gorbachev said
Social and political orders in one country or another have changed in the past and may change m the future But 
this is exclusively the affair of the people of that country and is their choice Any interference m the domestic 
affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of sutes—friends allies and others—are inadmissible (M S 
Gorbachev “Obshcheevropeiskn protsess idet vpered ” Pray da 7 July 1989)
In Helsinki m October he set up Soviet Finnish relations as a model for relations between a big country and a small 
country a model of relations between states with different social systems a model of relations between neighbors 
Quoted m New York Tunes 26 October 1989 p 7
6 Speaking against charges by CPSU conservatives that Gorbachev s policies had resulted in the loss of Eastern Europe 
then Foreign Munster Eduard Shevardnadze responded
Perestroika is not responsible for the destruction of the political structure of Europe It was destroyed by the will 
of peoples no longer willing to put up with oppression The undermining of faith m socialism based on 
suppression and violence began in the 1940s not m 1985 Remember the Czechoslovak Spring? Surely the 
Czechoslovak Spring could not be viewed as imperialist mingues And how many examples of that kind are there!
(E Shevardnadze Vystuplenna na plenume TsK KPSS Pravda 8 February 1990 p 3)
4Events in Eastern Europe after mid 1989 went far beyond anything envisaged in Gorbachev s initial reform 
program for the USSR Gorbachev was committed to retaining communist party dominance while expanding 
some political liberties and making an essentially state socialist economic system more efficient and more 
responsive to public needs—though developments m the Baltics in early 1991 seem to indicate that whatever 
was left of a commitment to reform has been abandoned m the effort to reassert central control The East 
Europeans however moved far beyond those positions The new Polish government has already dismantled 
most of the infrastructure of the centralized economic system throughout the region pluralist governments 
committed to political democratization and economic pnvatizauon are now in place
As Poland pursues its independent path and as the USSR seemingly stands on the verge of disintegration or 
a return to the authoritarian policies of the past, what are the prospects for relations between these countries9 
That is the question to be addressed after the developments in Poland that led to the 1989 revolution are outlined
Poland m the 1980s Background to the Revolution
The irony of developments m Poland is that of a society which moved the furthest toward genuine political 
pluralism during the communist era despite the imposition of martial law m 1981 83 Moreover events in 
Poland served as a stimulus to (or at least catalyst for) reform elsewhere m Eastern Europe Autonomous 
societal initiatives for reform had begun long before Solidarity became synonymous with Polish opposition In 
the pre Solidarity years analysts identified three mam currents from which society would press reforms on state 
authority intellectuals and students industrial workers and the Catholic Church Initially these groups were 
isolated from one another In 1968 students and intellectuals presented demands for greater freedom of 
expression but remained isolated from workers while in 1970-71 workers struck en masse for economic 
demands and confronted state suppression without the support of the intellectuals and students 7 As the 
economic and social situation worsened throughout the country the center of gravity of reform shifted from 
limited circles of intellectuals to a broader social strain involving thousands prepared to engage m public protest 
A social movement gradually evolved which shifted its strategy from attempting to influence the system by 
exerting pressure from within the party to an emphasis on social pressure from outside designed to transform the 
relationship between state and society8
Some analysts contend that postwar Poland suffered crises of identity penetration and participation more 
severely than all the European socialist countries 9 While these crises escalated during the 1970s a significant 
number of autonomous civic organizations such as the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) came into being 
because existing official institutions failed to realize their objectives and could not meet citizen needs It was up 
to new groups to limit the state s decision making power and to introduce innovation into the social system10 
In the legal Solidarity penod of 1980 81 a full range of societal groups developed a successful coalition strategy 
of consolidated pluralism that mobilized the majonty of society against the regime11 This effort had the direct 
impact of diminishing the preeminence of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) as the leading and guiding 
force m Polish society m the years following the suppression of Solidarity Subsequent efforts to promote a 
political dialogue between non party organizations and PUWP sponsored associations such as PRON (Patriotic 
Movement for Naüonal Survival) failed—made all the worse by steadily deteriorating economic conditions
7 Jacques Rupnik Dissent in Poland 1968 78 in Rudolf Tokés ed Opposition in Eastern Europe (Baltimore Johns 
Hopkins Press 1979) p 60
8 David Ost Towards a Neocorporatist Solution in Eastern Europe Eastern European Politics and Society voi 3 (1989) p 
164
9 Andrzej Korbonski “Nationalism and Pluralism and the Process of PoliUcal Development in Eastern Europe International 
Political Science Review voi 10 (1989) pp 254 259
10 See Peter Rama Independent Social Movements in Poland (London Orbis Books 1989) pp 13 21
11 See the chapters by Mana Halamska Barbara Wejnert and Pawel Kreczynski and Krzysztof Nowak m Research in Social 
Movements Conflicts and Change (Greenwich CN JAI Press 1988) volume 10 On pluralism in European communist 
systems see Alexander C Pacek and Roger E Kanet, Revolutionary Change m Eastern Europe in Hpyong Kim and Jane 
Shapiro Zacek eds Reform in Communist Countries (Washington The Washington Institute 1991) pp 103 140
While the PUWP faced increasing challenges to its dominant position in Polish society the USSR 
continued to make clear its overriding interest in the maintenance of that domination Because of its geographic 
location within the staging area for the second echelon of Warsaw Pact troops facing NATO countries the 
western region of Poland was of major military significance to the USSR Besides serving as the primary 
logistical link to the twenty odd Soviet divisions deployed m East Germany Poland was also expected m case 
of war to function as a staging area from which Soviet naval infantry would move against the Danish islands 
and the West German port of Kiel In 1981 Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Marshal Viktor G Kulikov 
reportedly attempted to convince President Brezhnev that Soviet armed forces should invade and occupy Poland 
because of the threat of Solidarity activities to local communist authority12
Rather than nsk the use of military force Kremlin decision makers first applied psychological pressures to 
contain the dissident movement m Poland During spring and summer 1981 extended Warsaw Pact military 
exercises on Polish territory and Soviet military exercises near Polish borders served as threats that the USSR 
might invade to suppress the Solidarity movement13 Later Polish armed forces became the surrogate 
occupation authority for the USSR Invoking martial law on 13 December 1981 the government of Gen 
Wojciech Jaruzelski implemented a plan drawn up under the supervision of the head of the Soviet military 
mission in Warsaw By then the ruling PUWP had lost all credibility and much of its membership as political 
authority and economic power gravitated toward the twelve million strong urban and rural Sohdarnosc labor 
unions 14
Nineteen months of military rule officially ended on 21 July 1983 After the ban on Solidarity as a legal 
organization however many martial law controls were permanently institutionalized through additions to the 
penal code Regime spokesmen admitted holding one hundred and nmety political prisoners (non government 
estimates placed the total at between four and five thousand) The last two hundred and twenty five individuals 
were not released until the September 1986 amnesty 15
Gorbachev s initial statements about Poland did not diverge appreciably from past justifications of marnai 
law Though he admitted in the course of his speech to the tenth congress of the PUWP on 30 June 1986 that 
the cnsis of the late 1970s and early 1980s had involved a protest against distortions of socialism he added 
that to attack the socialist system attempt to subvert it from without to tear away this or that country from 
the socialist community—means to encroach not only on the will of the people but also on the entire postwar 
settlement and m the last analysis on peace ”16 Two years later during a trip to Poland Gorbachev attempted 
to convince the Poles of their good fortune that at this stage of history there has appeared a man like General 
Jaruzelski 17
Within Poland until 1986 87 there was a discernible weakening of opposition efforts as the number of 
mdependent activists declined markedly after the lifting of martial law and the issuance of an amnesty for
12 Cited by Drew Middleton in Poland s Geography Russia s Gateway to West, New York Times 6 April 1981 p A 11 
Former Gen S Prochazka stated that 45 000 of his Czechoslovak troops had been poised to invade Polish Silesia in 
coordination with Soviet movements from the USSR and a token East German presence m the West The planned attack 
was cancelled on 5 December 1981 See Leszek Mazan s interview Juz siedzielismy w czolgach Polity luz (Warsaw) no 
37 (15 September 1990) p 13
13 Military maneuvers on Polish territory lasted twenty two days until 7 April the longest m Warsaw Pact history The USSR 
itself conducted exerases during 4 12 September 1981 in Belorussia and along the Baltic sea coast See Maj Gen AJ 
Skryl mk chief editor Zapad 81 (Moscow Voemzdat 1982)
14 Gen A F Shcheglov head of the 800 member strong Soviet military mission to Warsaw oversaw the development of the 
plan For a discussion of the martial law decision by an insider see R J Kuklinski Wojna przeciw narodowi Kultura 
(Pans) May 1987 pp 3 57 Some 800 000 members officially left the communist party during 1980 1982 according to 
Jozef Barecki et al Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy 1981 1983 (Warsaw PWE 1984) p 151
15 Amnesty International Report (London Amnesty International 1984) pp 293 297 editonal Freedom as Seen from 
Poland New York Tunes 23 August 1986 p 22
16 Vystupleme Tovanshcha Gorbacheva M S Pravda 1 July 1986 p 1
17 Cited in Jackson Diehl Gorbachev Plays It Safe—and Makes No Gams—in Polish Visit Washington Post 15 July 1988
6political prisoners Yet pluralist ideals and hoped for reforms were at an all time high among citizens 18 The 
veritable explosion of civic activity in 1988 89 was the direct outcome of a seriously weakened state disastrous 
economic problems including a severe decime in living standards and an increasingly well organized and 
determined civil society which not only survived the crackdown of December 1981 but benefited from the 
communist party s venal image In fact, the opposition m the post 1981 period became considerably 
diversified19
The explosion of autonomous political groups and the failure of the Jaruzelski government to generate 
support for its policies led the PUWP Central Committee in January 1989 passed a pluralism resolutton m 
an attempt to build support for needed economic reforms However the resolution was approved amid heated 
debate and apprehension among officials that legalizing independent trade unions could prove to be suicidal 
Less than a month later Politburo members deliberated on the prospects for a multiparty system where the 
PUWP might give up its leading role if ousted by a legitimate successor 120 While the regime did not define 
clearly what type of alternative party would be considered legitimate some officials expressed the desire for 
competing socialist parties vying for the voters favor in free elections Nonetheless a variety of parties 
representing different ideological positions either appeared or m the case of pre communist parties attempted to 
reestablish themselves
Another important development which spurred reform efforts was the establishment, by independent groups 
of umbrella organizations that could defend them more effectively against the state Government officials agreed 
to accept the establishment of separate public groups to deal with economic problems a tacit admission of the 
Party s inability to respond adequately to continuing economic deterioration 21 These initiatives along with 
many others including the spring 1989 negotiations between the regime and Solidarity were taken by organized 
citizens and not by officials elites or specialists
In Poland more than m any of the other East European countries the spontaneous growth of independent 
activity and its polarization were fueled by the failure of a highly centralized system The programs of 
autonomous groups aimed at pushing the country m a pluralist direction with a functioning parliamentary 
system an illegitimate communist leadership could offer nothing to stem the growing tide of demands
Unlike the situation of the hard line regimes of East Germany and Czechoslovakia however Poland s 
relationship with Gorbachev s USSR was convivial to the extent that the Soviets showed understanding of the 
complexity of the Polish situation The Jaruzelski leadership was less concerned about the spillover effects of 
Soviet reforms than with the positive endorsement that such reforms lent to Poland s own reform efforts22 m 
pursuing reforms and also for taking a realistic stance about the nature and limits of intra bloc relations Until 
Jaruzelski stepped down from power however there were no overt gestures of concern about the prospects for 
substantial economic and political instability in the immediate future Moscow remained calm during the 
Round Table discussions between the Polish government and Solidarity that m the face of growing civil 
disobedience led m Apnl 1989 to the legalization of the mdependent labor movement and major electoral 
reforms a month later the Roman Catholic Church was granted full legal status
18 The survey Studenci Wars za wy 1983 documents these views It was administered in the first half of that year with a 
sample of 650 students from Warsaw University and the Warsaw Polytechnic Cited in Maurice D Simon Citizenship in a 
New Polish Context in Charles J Bukowski and Mark A Chichock eds Prospects For Change in Socialist Systems 
Challenges and Responses (New York Praeger 1987) pp 87 94
19 A Smolar and P Kende The Role o f Opposition The Role o f Opposition Groups on the Eve o f Democratization in Poland 
and Hungary 1987 1988 (Munich “PROJEKT 1989) pp 11 34 and Jin Pehe Independent Movements m Eastern 
Europe Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFER) RAD Background Research (hereafter BR)/22 (17 November 1988)
PP 121
20 B de Weydenthal PUWP Accepts the Prospect of Legalizing Solidanty RFER Polish Situation Report (hereafter SR)/2 
(20 January 1989) pp 3-6 and Roman Stefanowski Poland s Economic Results in 1988 RFER Polish SR/4 (3 March 
1989) pp 33 35
21 Louisa Vinton “Is Dialogue More Likely After the Strikes? RFER Polish SR/9 (7 June 1989) pp 3 8
22 Karen Dawisha Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Reform (Cambndge New York Cambndge University Press 1988) p 167
7The Polish election of 5 June 1989 stood as the most far reaching manifestation of the reform process m 
Eastern Europe unni the upheavals of fall 1989 In terms of formal political power the new electoral laws were 
meant to limit the power of the opposition Only 35 percent of the 460 seats for the Sejm or lower house 
were filled through competitive contests while the elections for the newly established 100 seat Senate were 
open The results proved a stunning defeat for the ruling Polish United Workers Party Its candidates failed to 
win a smgle seat for which there was a contested race while Solidarity candidates took all but one of the seats 
lost by the PUWP Moreover all but two of thirty five key PUWP figures who ran unopposed failed to gain 
the required majority of the votes cast to ensure reelection Government efforts to limit the impact of the new 
electoral system failed, largely because the voters were able to strike off so many officials from the ballot23
Over summer 1989 much political jockeying occurred before the emergence of a Solidarity led government 
m September In July the issue was the selection of a new president Only after once withdrawing from the 
race and pushing the candidacy of the interior minister General Czeslaw Kiszczak was Wojciech Jaruzelski 
eventually elected president on 19 July by the margin of a single vote After his election to the presidency 
Jaruzelski fulfilled an earlier pledge to resign as head of the PUWP m favor of long time Solidarity nemesis 
Mieczyslaw Rakowski Though the communists successfully pushed through parliament General Kiszczak s 
candidacy for the premiership he failed to form a grand coalition government and on 24 August, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki was selected as the new prime minister Mazowiecki a Catholic intellectual with extensive 
political experience had played a major role m the creation of Solidarity m 1980 24 He was editor m chief of 
Tygodnik Sohdarnosc the communist bloc s first truly mdependent weekly
After decades of the most intense and tenacious opposition activity in the region the Poles had broken the 
political dominance of the communist party For the first time since World War II they had a non communist 
prime minister and a true coalition government (m which communists held but four of twenty three cabinet 
level appointments)—but one faced with imminent collapse of the economy and problems of generating 
effective public support for economic reform policies
Independent Poland, the Path to Democracy and Prosperity7
The new government was committed to establishing and strengthening democratic political processes and within 
weeks opted for wide ranging and radical economic reforms that would create the foundations for a market 
economy In January 1990 the remnants of the PUWP abolished the old party to form the Party of Social 
Democracy of the Republic of Poland This new party however found virtually no support within the country 
By spnng it lost its stranglehold on politically organizing faetones and offices and most of its property was 
confiscated by the Sejm. This decision and the debate that preceded it demonstrated the irrelevance of the 
PUWP s successor for contemporary Poland 25
Despite the successes of Mazowiecki s government in laymg the foundations for economic reform by 
spnng and summer of 1990 senous political divisions threatened the unity of the Sohdanty movement 
Mazowiecki was strongly cnticized for the continuing role of communists and former communists m important 
political and administrative positions But even when he fired ex commumst cabinet members m July a 
parliamentary faction committed to Lech Walesa blocked the approval of Mazowiecki s nommees to replace the
23 Vladimir V Kusm Voting Communism out of Office Polish Style RFER RAD BR/108 (19 June 1989) pp 1 5
24 Two days before the vote President Gorbachev reportedly convinced Polish party leader Mieczyslaw Rakowski over the 
telephone that he should cooperate with Sohdanty See Richard F Staar Poland Renewal or Stagnation? Current 
History 88 no 541 (November 1989) 373 76
25 See J B de Weydenthal Communists Dissolve Party Set Up New Social Democratic Group Report on Eastern Europe 
(hereafter REE) vol 1 no 7 (1990) pp 23 27 Louisa Vinton “The Politics of Property Divesting the Polish 
Communist Party of Its Assets REE vol 1 no 17 (1990) pp 17 28
8communists Only mediation by the Church which brought the two Solidarity leaders together resolved the 
parliamentary crisis 26
With the defeat of the common enemy of commumsm the various factions that made up Solidarity since its 
inception m 1980 found it increasingly difficult to hold together The problem faced by Mazowiecki was the 
need to balance the demands of economic reform with those of maintaining social tranquility The fact that 
Solidarity s roots are in the labor union movement and that those loyal to Lech Walesa had had a different 
political agenda from that of the government, became clear during 1990 The strike of railway workers for wage 
increases to balance inflation highlighted the problem Moreover the political divisions m Poland were 
complicated by personal rivalries among key personalities While Walesa s political base remained m the labor 
movement and among the locally based citizens committees Prime Minister Mazowiecki s support was 
concentrated among the intellectuals
The divisions within Solidarity were formalized by summer 1990 with the emergence of two de facto 
parues the Center Alliance formed by Walesa s close associates and the Civic Movement Democraüc Action 
(with the Polish acronym of ROAD) committed to Mazowiecki27 The depth of the split became evident during 
the fall presidential election campaign between Walesa and Mazowiecki to select a replacement for President 
Jaruzelski They attacked one another in an especially bitter manner providing the opportunity for a complete 
outsider political emigré Stanislaw Tyminski to run a strong second m the initial round of the election on 25 
November and to force a run off with Walesa on 9 December won decisively by the latter (74 25 to 25 75 
percent)
In the face of the potential for political polarization it is unclear whether as president Walesa will be able 
or willing to pursue the policies required to establish a stable democracy However his appointment of Jan 
Krzysztof Bielecki as prime minister an economist committed to continuing the economic policies of his 
predecessor argues well for Walesa s commitment to healing political divisions Moreover the retention in 
cabinet posts of central figures from the Mazowiecki government—especially Finance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz the architect of the drastic program of economic reform—reinforces this assessment28
Intertwined with the political issues have been those associated with the economic crisis The first task 
facmg the new Solidarity government when it took power was the need to bring inflation under control as part 
of a program of stimulating an economy on the verge of total collapse During 1989 inflation had reached an 
estimated 640 percent The economic reform package initiated on 1 January 1990 called for a four phase 
program of action based on shock therapy to turn around the economy 1) a 3-4 month period to break the 
inflationary spiral 2) the decontrolling of consumer goods industries and the introduction of some privatization 
3) the much more difficult job of restructuring heavy industry and 4) by late 1993 making Polish currency 
convertible The first stage of the program was introduced on 1 January with the elimination of pnce controls 
and subsidies on about half of all goods (and an additional 30 percent by May) By mid 1990 these stiff 
measures brought inflation down to about 4 percent per month and stabilized the foreign exchange rate however 
by the end of the year it was estimated that the rate of inflation for the entire year was 250 percent By March 
1990 a plan for privatizing the economy was m place and by May Poland was generating a foreign trade 
surplus The costs of this success however were very high industrial output of state industries dropped more 
than 30 percent, gross domestic product for the year fell by an estimated 13 percent, official unemployment 
reached over one million or 8 1 percent of the total workforce by the end of the year and real wages dropped by 
almost a third On the other hand there were positive indicators that the shock therapy was working hard
26 Speech of Tadeusz Mazowiecki to parliament. Premier apeluje Gazeta wyborcza 7 8 July 1990 p 1 See also Louisa 
Vinton Government Contends with Collapse of Governing Coalition REE vol 1 no 30 (1990) pp 29 35 and 
Richard F Staar “Transition m Poland Current History 89 no 551 (December 1990) 401 04 426 27
27 On these political divisions see the reports by Louisa Vinton Solidarity s Rival Offspring Center Alliance and 
Democraüc Acüon REE vol 1 no 38 (1990) pp 15 25 Poliücal Pames and Coalitions m the Local Government 
Elections REE vol 1 no 26 (1990) pp 26 30- and Upheaval m Solidarity s Parliamentary Caucus REE vol 1 no 
47 (1990) pp 24 27
28 See Stephen Engelberg New Prime Munster s Cabinet Is Approved New York Times 13 January 1991 p 4
9currency reserves were at a record $4 1 billion and substantial positive balances were recorded in trade with both 
the East and the West—four billion rubles and $4 5 billion respectively 29
The Soviet Union and Independent Poland
To this point the background relevant to an assessment of Soviet Polish relations has been presented In this 
final substantive section the specifics of Soviet policy toward Poland m the recent past and likely future 
developments in relations between the two countries will be discussed As noted an essential element in the 
revolutionary transformation that swept over Eastern Europe since summer 1989 was the reassessment of Soviet 
foreign policy goals and methods that influenced not only the Soviet view of its neighbors but the very nature 
of the socio political systems of the region
After the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981 Soviet Polish relations stabilized With this 
stabilization came the interpretation that Soviet officials held towards the labor unrest and near collapse of 
Poland s communist government Elements hostile to socialist rule tools of Western propaganda machines 
and puppets of anti socialist movements were charged with responsibility for the manipulation of the labor 
troubles 30 This strongly negative interpretation of events in Poland as the result of Western intervention lasted 
until 1988 in response to the senes of pnce increases and strikes that rocked Poland early that year Pravda 
noted that the enemies of socialism backed the strikes 31 By portraying the sinkers as hooligans or as stooges 
of Western imperialism the Soviets could continue to present the Polish cnsis along traditional ideological 
lines
By September 1988 when the Polish government finally accepted the sinkers demands for the first set of 
discussions the Soviet position had shifted. Sohdanty was referred to simply as the opposition Later the 
Round Table agreements of 5 April 1989 which led to the competitive elections that brought down the 
communist government, were received in Moscow as an example of Poland s struggle for the renewal of 
socialism The legalization of Sohdanty and the promise of at least partial representation in the Sejm by 
members of the opposition was presented as the development of the Polish People s Republic as a state of 
socialist parliamentary democracy and as a society based on political and trade union pluralism 32
Soviet reaction to the overwhelming defeat of the PUWP m the parliamentary elections of June 1989 
proved to be much calmer than would have been expected The initial election reports lamented the humiliation 
of the PUWP at the polls and the formation of the first non communist government in Poland since the 
imposition of communist rule in 1944 did meet with some notes of concern from the Soviet media But, in 
Ime with new thinking Poles were presented as having the right to try to find a solution to their own 
problems 33 After the swearing in of the government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki the Soviet press 
emphasized the Soviet desire to mam tain cordial relations and cautioned against efforts at thinking in terms of 
revenge34
29 See Vlad Sobell Shock Therapy as a Tool of Economic Reform REE vol 1 no 31 (1990) pp 49 53 and Louisa 
Vinton Privatization Plan Prepared REE  voL 1 no 14 (1990) pp 28 32 For data on the sute of the Polish economy 
see Statystyki Polski supplement to Rzeczpospolita 30 July 1990 Gazeta wyborcza 24 August 1990 and the report of 
Krzysztof Lutostanski of the Mam Statistical Office as cited m RFEJRL Daily Report no 240 19 December 1990 p 1
30 See for example “Between the Bug and the Odra International Affairs no 6 (June 1986) pp 123 24 On Soviet policy 
see Roger E Kanet “The Polish Cnsis and Poland s Allies in Jack Bielasiak and Maunce D Simon eds Polish 
Politics Edge o f the Abyss (New York Praeger 1984) pp 317 44 and Arthur R Rachwald In Search of Poland The 
Superpowers Response to Solidarity 1980 1989 (Stanford CA Hoover Institution Press 1990)
31 Political commentator Viulyi Kononov traced the history of efforts by imperialist circles and the antisocialist forces still 
intact in those countnes to rouse counterrevolutionary forces in the 1950s 1960s and 1980s The strikes unleashed by 
Sohdanty were undermining efforts at democratization in Poland he mam tamed Vitalyi Kononov “Zemlia
vos midesiatykh V poiskakh novogo dinamiu ” Pravda 6 September 1988 p 4
32 Urok kompromissov—V Varshave zakonchilas vstrecha za kruglym stoloni Izvestua 6 April 1989 p 5
33 Nuzhna shirokaia koalitsua—Pol sha posle vyborov Izvestiia 22 June 1989 p 4 Pol sha—Oppozitsua Razdeliat 
chtoby vlastvovat Izvestua 11 August 1989 p 4 and “V press tsentre MID SSSR, Pravda 12 August 1989 p 4
34 Viktor Shutkevich Premiery i kaskadery Komsomol skaia pravda 22 August 1989 p 3
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In the first sixteen months after the emergence of the Solidarity government, Polish foreign policy 
underwent changes as far reaching as those in the domestic political and economic realms Most important were 
the assertions of Polish mdependence and the working out of a new relationship with the Soviet Union the 
concerns about the implications for Pohsh security of the reunification of Germany and the entrance of Poland 
into the new integrated Europe The relationship with the Soviet Umon underwent several important changes 
during 1990 Of symbolic importance was the public admission by the USSR after almost five decades of 
denial that tens of thousands of Pohsh officers had indeed been murdered by Soviet forces at Katyn Forest and 
elsewhere early in World War n  Probable graves were identified, and President Gorbachev turned over to the 
Polish government documents relevant to the case 35
Though the Pohsh government made no attempt to leave the Soviet alliance system during 1990 it 
announced a new defense doctrine that in effect, annulled Poland s adherence to a joint military doctrine within 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) Pressures mounted m Poland to speed up the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Pohsh territory Some 20 000 soldiers were scheduled to depart by the end of 1990 with an 
additional 58 000 still stationed m Poland In a wide ranging debate within the Senate in early September 
1990 the enure foundation of relations with the USSR was questioned Although Senate resolutions are only 
advisory they do point to the strength of pubhc sentiment in Poland for a substantial change m the terms of the 
relationship with the USSR Yet the Polish government remained sensitive to the need for great care m not 
pushing too rapidly m its new relationship with the USSR36 Throughout this period Foreign Minister 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski outlined on various occasions the central elements of the foreign policy of the Polish 
state He characterized relations with the USSR as normal interstate and intergovernmental relations no 
longer based on ideological considerations 37
Trade has emerged as an area of increasing concern m Soviet Polish relations Despite contractual 
obligations problems in the USSR s petroleum industry have resulted m decreases in Soviet oil deliveries to 
Poland Three times during the first eight months of 1990 the Soviets unilaterally changed the terms of trade 
cancelled guaranteed supplies of petroleum and demanded that the Poles pay for contracted imports m hard 
currency rather than through settlement procedures long m place within the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) The issue of trade relations with the USSR is of great importance for the Poles since the 
revival of their own economy depends to a great extent on their ability to restructure and develop their economic 
relations with the USSR and their other neighbors One result of the visit to the USSR by Foreign Minister 
Skubiszewski m October 1990 was an agreement for the delivery of 10 million tons of Soviet oil m 1991—2 7 
million tons less than agreed to m the past and only 70 percent of Poland s needs 38
Another issue of special importance m Poland s foreign policy was the concern about the implications of 
German reunification for Poland s western boundary and the initial refusal of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to give 
permanent guarantees about the Oder Neissa border The general agreement signed at the two-plus four talks 
on German unification m Pans m July and the bilateral treaty between the Federal Republic and Poland signed 
on 14 November 1990 put this issue to rest and thus reduced the perceived secunty need of the continued 
presence in Poland of Soviet forces39
35 Karen Lemiski and J B de Weydenthal, “Soviet Officials Identify Probable Graves of Polish Officers REE vol 1 no 32 
(1990) pp 27 29
36 See Anna Sabbat Swidlicka Senate Calls for Changes in Eastern Policy REE vol 1 no 39 (1990) pp 21 26 and 
Aleksandr Os kin A esli glazami Poliakov vzglianat na prebyvame Sovetskikh voisk v ich strane Ogonek no 40 
(1990) pp 30 31
37 See Vladimir Matovic Vlastuna—ne aplaudiramo Borba 21 22 April 1990 p 6 translated as “Skubiszewski Interviewed 
by SFRY Paper FBIS EEU 20 Apnl 1990 pp 46 47
38 J B de Weydenthal Prospects for Soviet Pohsh Trade REE vol 1 no 44 (1990) pp 23 25 The Soviet trade 
position is outlined by Jerzy Osiatyn ski. Director of the Central Planning Office in “Przykrçcame Kuika Rzeczpospohta 
14 September 1990 p 5  On Skubiszewski s visit to Moscow see Rzeczpospohta 17 October 1990 and “Ofitsial nyi 
vizit K Skubishchevskogo v SSSR, Vestmk Mmisterstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR no 21 21 November 1990 pp 3 5
39 J B de Weydenthal, Settling the Oder Neisse Issue REE vol 1 no 31 (1990) pp 46-48 For the treaty see 
“Historyczny akt Rzeczpospohta 15 November 1990
Throughout 1990 the Polish democratic government also engaged m efforts to establish special ties with 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary the two other emerging democracies m East-Central Europe In part the efforts to 
forge these special contacts were related to the desire to change the nature of relations within the WTO and to 
strengthen Poland s position m relationship to its major long term objective of full entry mto a new and 
integrated Europe 40
Conclusions
After this examination of the domestic and Soviet related sources of change m Poland and of the impact of these 
changes on relations with the USSR a brief effort will be made to assess likely developments m Polish Soviet 
relations m the near future This assessment is based on several assumptions about developments m both 
countries First of all on the USSR side the discussion is predicated on the assumption that the leadership will 
continue to be engaged m dealing with domestic economic and political problems that will be virtually all 
engrossing—the rejuvenation of a moribund economy the prevention of civil war among hostile ethnic 
communities and the working out of new constitutional relationships among the republics that comprise the 
USSR Closely related to these concerns will be the continuing effort to strengthen relations with the West 
especially the United States in order to ensure the international stability required to focus on these domestic 
problems and to acquire the capital needed to rebuild the economy However given the military crackdown in 
the Baltics and Gorbachev s general retreat from reform by early 1991 the international environment in Europe 
may rapidly deteriorate Should that occur the picture painted below may be too sanguine
On the Polish side we assume continued rapid movement toward a free economy the commitment to 
strengthening Polish independence vis à vis the USSR and the objective of integrating Poland within the 
economic and political structures of a united Europe We assume that despite the centimes old hostilities 
between Poland and Russia and the oppressive and exploitative nature of the Soviet Polish relationship from 
1944 to 1989 for reasons of enlightened self interest, Polish policy toward the USSR will not be based on 
efforts to gain revenge or to openly pursue anti Soviet initiatives
Based on these assumptions a brief discussion follows of the likely evolution of the Soviet Polish 
relationship over the next few years In the military sphere it is most likely that all USSR troops will be 
withdrawn from Polish territory by late 1992 Not only in Poland but throughout the entire Warsaw Pact 
region the Soviets have already committed themselves to withdrawal and the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a 
military alliance reinforces the reduced Soviet military role As Vladimir Kusin has argued the end of the 
superpower confrontation and of the USSR s commitment to controlling all developments within East Central 
Europe have deprived Soviet forces stationed m the region with any raison d etre The collapse of the system of 
communist internationalism directed from Moscow has eliminated the mission of the USSR s troops stationed 
m East Central Europe 41 In fact, given Soviet troop withdrawals the disappearance of the German Democratic 
Republic and its army and the decision of several member countries to reduce their role within the Warsaw Pact, 
the decision was to be expected that converted the Pact along with the CMEA into predominantly political 
organizations whose purposes relate to ensuring stable political relations within the region What emerges from 
those changes will depend primarily on political developments within the USSR and on the European wide 
political and security system that evolves over the next decade The mam point, however is the fact that Poland 
will no longer be bound militarily to the USSR and that Warsaw Pact mechanisms will no longer exist through 
which Soviet leaders will be able—as they were for forty years—to control Poland
Closely related to this issue is the fact that the disappearance of the PUWP and the effective disappearance 
of the CMEA as a functioning organization have removed two additional mechanisms that have been important 
to the ability of the USSR to exert strong influence even control over developments m Poland Current and
40 See J B de Weydenthal, Poland and the Soviet Alliance System REE vol 1 no 26 (1990) p 32 and J B de 
Weydenthal, Poland Finding a Place in Europe REE vol 1 no 52 (1990) p 23
41 Vladimir V Kusin “The Soviet Troops Mission Abandoned REE vol 1 no 36 (1990) pp 37 38
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future relations will parallel those that exist between other countries that is they will be based on negotiated 
agreements m which both sides attempt to accomplish key objectives
This does not mean that Soviet Polish relations will not experience senous problems Wrongs of the past 
are neither easily nor quickly forgotten Behavior patterns of the past are not easily modified Thus 
antagonisms toward Russia and the USSR are likely to be an important element in the Polish foreign policy 
debate and may even on occasion influence pokey decisions themselves In such cases we can well expect 
friction in relations Related to this is the loudly expressed concern in Poland about the rights of Pohsh 
compatriots living in the Soviet Union—especially m Lithuania and Ukraine 42
Poland is likely to continue to try to establish political and especially economic ties with the western 
republics of the USSR The decentralization of economic decision making m the USSR and the emergence of at 
least semi autonomous republics within the constitutional framework of the USSR has resulted in an expansion 
of mutually beneficial activities at this level It is not clear to what extent the crackdown in the Baltics portends 
a return to the centralized decision making that for more than half a decade has characterized the USSR At the 
same time from the Polish perspective the restructuring of the framework within which economic relations 
occur with the USSR is essential Smce 1989 the USSR has tended to behave in the economic realm with 
heavy handed disregard for the interests of former clients similar to that displayed m the past Until a new more 
equitable framework is created trade relations are likely to remain a source of friction m relations between the 
two countries
While the Poles have already restructured their security and political relationship with the Soviet Union and 
are also committed to major changes m their economic relations they also seek major changes in their relations 
with the W est43 Of major concern is the establishment of relations with the European Community that will 
result in Poland s full reentry into the European community of nations This process will depend on Poland s 
ability to establish a stable political system and a successful and productive economy Given the level of 
Poland s continuing economic dependence on the USSR—for both raw materials and markets—the long term 
solution of economic problems depends on success m restructuring economic relations with the USSR as well 
as on the willingness of the West to provide substantial financial support
There are many well known historical reasons that relations between mdependent post communist Poland 
and the Soviet Umon/Russia may be tense and conflictual There are just as many reasons beginning with 
economic and security concerns that call for the two countries to overcome past differences and work out a 
relationship that will be mutually beneficial In the course of the first sixteen months after the creation of the 
Solidarity government, they made substantial progress m this direction and leaders such as Gorbachev and 
Walesa seem committed to continuing this effort Though it is impossible to predict with any degree of 
certainty the outcome of current developments one can only hope that stability and mutual benefit will 
predominate in the relations between the two countries
42 Dunng his Visit to Moscow in November 1989 Prune Minister Mazowiecki discussed two major issues with his Soviet 
counterparts trade relations and the position of the Polish minority in the USSR See Tomasz Lubienski, “Kartki z Rosji 
Tygodmk Solidarnosc 8 December 1989 p 40 On the call for dual citizenship for Poles m the USSR and the opening 
up of Pohsh language schools and churches see Krzysztof Leski in Gazeta wyboreza 23 November 1989 p 1
43 See the interview with Foreign Minister Skubiszewski who noted But most of all we see cooperation as embracing all of 
Europe with emphasis on rebuilding the link with the EC with which we are interested m political cooperauon though we 
are primarily concerned about economic cooperauon Rzysztof Leski Wywiad z mimstrem Krzysztofem Skubiszewskim 
Rewidujemy Uklad Warszawski Gazeta wyboreza 26 July 1990 p 3
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